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Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 125 S. Ct. 1118 (2005).
Elizabeth Mills, 2L, University of Mississippi School of
Law
On February 22, 2005, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the First Circuit Court of Appeals
holding that the Super Scoop, a dredge used during
the Boston Big Dig, qualified as a “vessel” for purpos-
es of federal law.
Background
As a part of Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel Project,
also known as the “Big Dig,” the Super Scoop dug the
50 foot deep, 100 foot wide, three-quarter mile long
trench underneath the Boston Harbor for the Ted
Williams Tunnel. At the time, Dutra Construction
Company owned the Super Scoop, the world’s largest
dredge, which consists of a huge floating platform
with a clamshell bucket hanging below the water. The
bucket takes sediment off of the ocean floor and
deposits it on scows floating beside it.
The Super Scoop is similar to traditional seagoing
vessels because it has a captain and crew, navigation-
al lights, ballast tanks, and a crew dining area.
However, it differs from traditional seagoing vessels
because it has limited self-propulsion. The Super
Scoop uses its anchors and cables to move short dis-
tances, but it uses a tugboat to move long distances.
Willard Stewart, a marine engineer, was seriously
injured while working on the Super Scoop during the
harbor dredging project. Stewart’s accident occurred
when the Super Scoop was idle due to engine problems
with Scow No. 4, one of the vessels receiving the
dredged materials. Stewart was feeding wire beside a
hatch on Scow No. 4 when the Super Scoop moved the
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dept.
of the Army, 398 F.3d 105 (2005).
Jeffery Schiffman, 2L, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law (Cleveland State University)
In February, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ decision
to permit the construction of an offshore data tower,
the first phase of a controversial wind farm project
off the coast of Massachusetts.  Alliance to Protect
Nantucket Sound, a vocal opponent of the wind
farm, challenged the Corps’ issuance of a navigabili-
ty permit to Cape Wind Associates. The U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Corps and Cape Wind
in September of 2003.1
Background
On November 20, 2001, Cape Wind Associates
applied to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for a
navigability permit under Section 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899. Cape Wind wanted to con-
struct and operate an offshore data tower in the
Horseshoe Shoals area of Nantucket Sound. The
Horseshoe  Shoa l s  a re  loca ted  on  the  Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS), which is subject to federal
jurisdiction under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA). The proposed tower would be
170 feet high and anchored to the ocean floor using
three steel piles. The purpose of the tower would be
to gather information for use in a feasibility study
for a wind energy plant on Horseshoe Shoals.
(There was a separate application also submitted in
Wind Farm Survives Another
Challenge
See Wind Farm, page 14
See Super Scoop, page 18 
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From the 
Editor’s Desk
Well, here we are again at the start of another volume
of THE SANDBAR. Over the past year, many of you
have commented positively on our new format and
features. Thank you so much! This year we will con-
tinue to bring you the latest legislative and judicial
developments from across the country with some new
twists. First, after noticing that we were covering a lot
of cases from Puerto Rico, we’ve decided to make the
Caribbean one of our permanent regions. You can
look forward to more cases from Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands,  and other Caribbean nations.
Additionally this year, we are very pleased to
announce a new regular guest column entitled
“Reflections of a Knauss Fellow.”
This is a fantastic time to be working in the marine
policy field. There is so much going on right now.
B e t w e e n  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  i n  t h e  U . S .
Commission on Ocean Policy Report and the action
items in President Bush’s Ocean Action Plan, it
seems like at least one marine-related bill is intro-
duced in Congress every day. Congress is currently
considering a number of legislative initiatives that
could significantly affect how humans interact with
the ocean and coastal environment. We are keeping a
close eye on these initiatives and will provide full
coverage as those bills become laws.
As always, we welcome your thoughts, comments,
and suggestions. We are here to serve you, our sub-
scribers. Please let know what we can do to better
address your needs. Thank you again for continuing
to support our legal outreach efforts and we look for-
ward to another great year!
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The Knauss fellowship is a fantastic program which pro-
vides graduate students wonderful opportunities to work
in Washington, D.C. for a year. Few in the legal communi-
ty, however, are aware that law students are eligible,
strongly encouraged in fact, to participate. The editorial
staff here at THE SANDBAR was so excited to learn that a
recent law school graduate had been selected as a 2005
Knauss Fellow that we asked her to write a four-part
series  ref lecting on her experiences.  After reading
Elizabeth’s first installment, we cannot wait to see what
this year has in store for her. We know you will feel the
same way. Enjoy!!!
Elizabeth Taylor, 2005 Knauss Sea Grant Fellow; J.D.
Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland, OR (2004);
Member CA Bar.
After graduating from law school last spring and
wondering what to do next, I am happy to be spend-
ing 2005 as a Knauss fellow in Washington, D.C. The
Knauss fellowship was established in 1979 by former
NOAA administrator John A. Knauss. It provides the
opportunity for graduate students interested in
marine policy issues to work for a host in either the
executive or legislative branch in Washington, D.C.
for a year. The fellowship experience begins in
November with placement week, an exciting and
whirlwind week filled with informative presentations
and interviews with potential hosts. My host for the
year is the Marine Mammal Commission, an inde-
pendent agency of the U.S. which was created in 1972
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). 
The primary focus of the Commission is to pro-
vide independent oversight of the marine mammal
conservation policies and programs being carried out
by the federal regulatory agencies. The MMPA was
enacted in partial response to growing concerns
among scientists and the general public that certain
species and populations of marine mammals were in
danger of extinction or depletion as a result of human
activities. The Act was the first legislation anywhere
in the world to mandate an ecosystem approach to
marine resource management. 
My initial impressions of both the fellowship and
the Commission have been overwhelmingly positive.
The Sea Grant community is an amazing network
and Kola Garber, the director of fellowships, does a
wonderful job of organizing plenty of opportunities
to meet others in the marine policy world. There is
also no shortage of former Knauss alums to give
advice and provide valuable information. And of
course D.C. is an endless source of interesting and
knowledgeable persons involved in all aspects of
shaping future policy. 
To date, my work at the Commission has involved
numerous topics, including drafting sections of the
2004 annual report to Congress and participating in
various stakeholder meetings. I am particularly inter-
ested in international ocean policy issues and one of
the annual report sections I worked on was the
International Whaling Commission and their activi-
ties in 2004, particularly their annual meeting in
Sorrento, Italy last July. I am also involved in the
planning of several workshops the Commission will
be conducting this year at Congress’ request. The first
of these will be a workshop on killer whales and
predator/prey interaction to be held in Seattle this
spring. The second is a workshop this fall that will
attempt to identify the most endangered marine
mammals and measure the cost-effectiveness of the
actions being undertaken to conserve them. 
A range of marine mammal stakeholders travel to
our office to speak with the Commission. Recently,
we received visits from the Indigenous Peoples’
Council for Marine Mammals - a group of various
Alaska Native Organizations - and the Makah tribe
from Washington state. The Makah visit was of par-
ticular interest to me because I visited the tribe dur-
ing my first summer of law school while participating
in Lewis & Clark’s Indian Law Summer program and
have been following the course of the Makah whaling
developments. The Makah tribe recently filed an
application for a waiver under the MMPA, a long and
formal process that has never been completed before.
Stay tuned for more on the Makah and their intrigu-
ing story in my next installment.
Reflections of a
Knauss Fellow: 
Part 1
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Heller-Jersey City, 399 F.3d 248
(3rd Cir. 2005).
Jason Savarese, J.D.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld
an injunction requiring Honeywell International,
Inc., a chemical company, to excavate more than one
million tons of tidal wetlands soil. The soil was conta-
minated with toxic waste from the company’s factory,
and may cost more than $400 million to clean up.1
Background
From 1895 to 1954, Mutual Chemical Company of
America (Mutual) operated a chemical factory in
New Jersey. The factory processed chromium ore,
which resulted in a waste product rich in hexavalent
chromium. Hexavalent chromium is a known human
carcinogen that can also harm animals and benthic
creatures. Mutual dumped over one million tons of
this waste product into thirty-four acres of tidal wet-
lands along the Hackensack River. Honeywell is the
corporate successor to Mutual.
In 1982, a “green stream” and “yellowish-green
plumes” were spotted in the surface water near the
dump site. A year later, Honeywell officials observed
yellow water discharging into the Hackensack River
and said that the site was “extremely contaminated.”
However, Honeywell did nothing to remedy the situa-
t ion.  In 1988,  the New Jersey Department of
Environmental  Protect ion (NJDEP) ordered
Honeywell to clean up the site. While a permanent
remedy was sought, Honeywell erected a temporary,
plastic retaining cap over seventeen acres of the site,
and used concrete and asphalt to cover the rest. These
measures slowed the discharge rate, but did not pre-
vent all toxic discharges from the site.
While seeking land for the construction of afford-
able housing, the Interfaith Community Organization
(ICO), a group of about thirty-five churches in New
Jersey, came across the dump site and noticed that lit-
tle or nothing had been done to clean it up under
NJDEP’s order. In 1995, ICO and five individual
plaintiffs filed suit in federal court under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
claiming that the site was an “imminent and substan-
tial endangerment to health or the environment.”
The judge found that Honeywell was responsible for
the site, that it had violated RCRA, and entered an
injunction requiring Honeywell to excavate the con-
taminated soil. Honeywell appealed the judgment,
challenging the plaintiffs’ standing to sue, the trial
court’s  endangerment determination, and the
injunction.
To determine if the injunction was proper, the
Appeals Court looked to see if the trial court had
abused its discretion by relying on a “clearly erro-
neous” finding of fact. The Court weighed the RCRA
endangerment claim under the “clear error” test. No
clear error was found and both the injunction and the
RCRA claim were upheld. 
Standing
To file suit in federal court, a plaintiff must have
both constitutional and statutory standing. To have
constitutional standing, a plaintiff must show that
there was an injury-in-fact, that the injury was
caused by the conduct complained of, and that the
injury could be redressed by a favorable decision of
the court. Honeywell claimed that the plaintiffs
lacked the standing to file suit. The court disagreed.
The individual plaintiffs lived near the toxic site,
and walked along or fished in the Hackensack
River. The Appeals Court held that these activities
were enough to establish injury-in-fact, despite
Honeywell’s argument that standing required proof
of direct use, like swimming, wading, etc. The trial
court found that the plaintiffs were able to show
that their injuries were traceable to Honeywell and
were redressable, as an injunction would have
“more than a substantial likelihood” of reducing or
permanently ending the plaintiffs’ concerns and
exposure to the site.2
The plaintiffs also had statutory standing under
RCRA, which allows any person to file a lawsuit
against someone “who has contributed or who is con-
tributing to the past or present handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment.”3 The Court found the plaintiffs’ complaints to
be reasonable and based on a direct threat, satisfying
RCRA’s requirements. ICO and the other plaintiffs
had standing to sue Honeywell.
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Imminent and Substantial Endangerment
Honeywell claimed it did not violate RCRA and that
its discharges into the Hackensack River could not be
“substantial,” since New Jersey had only tentatively,
not formally, adopted remedial standards for river
sediment chromium when the lawsuit was filed.
Honeywell, however, conceded that it was legally
responsible for the dumping and that chromium
qualified as a solid, hazardous waste under RCRA.
The only question remaining for the court was
whether the site poses an imminent threat of serious
harm to health or the environment. 
The plastic liner and asphalt cap used to partially
contain the site’s toxic waste was riddled with holes
and cracks. These breaches allowed hexavalent
chromium to discharge into the Hackensack River,
groundwater, and river sediment. Honeywell admit-
ted that the site was discharging pollutants, which
could harm nearby aquatic organisms. NJDEP found
that the site’s chromium constituted a “substantial
risk of imminent damage to public health and safety
and imminent and severe damage to the environ-
ment.”4 At trial, the court required the plaintiffs to
prove (1) that the site might present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to a potential population;
(2) that the dangerous pollutant at the site was a haz-
ardous waste or solid under RCRA; (3) that the toxin
at the site was found in an amount greater than what
New Jersey determined was safe; and (4) that there
was a conduit for exposure to the toxin now or in the
future.5 The trial court found that the plaintiffs met
this standard, holding that the site was an endanger-
ment to human health and the environment and that
it was actually harming the environment. 
The Third Circuit found that the district court
held the plaintiffs to a higher-
than-necessary endangerment
showing by requiring them to
prove the third and fourth ele-
ments mentioned above. RCRA
contains no such elements. The
court found, however, that the
use of this elevated standard was
harmless error, as the plaintiffs
proved more than was necessary
for an endangerment showing,
and upheld the trial  court ’s
determination that the site posed
a substantial and imminent dan-
ger to the environment, people,
and animals.
Injunction
Finally, Honeywell argued that the trial court should
not have required excavation of the site, that the
injunction was not narrowly tailored, and not “neces-
sary” under RCRA. The Third Circuit found that the
injunction was necessary under RCRA, noting that
nothing less than excavation would stop the site’s
toxic waste from leaching into surrounding waters
and sediment. It also found that the injunction was
“reasonable and narrow,” since it simply required
Honeywell to do what was necessary to alleviate the
site’s endangerments. Honeywell is required only to
excavate the polluted soil, “remedy” the tainted river
sediments, and study the condition of deep ground-
water at the site. Honeywell does not have to treat the
groundwater unless the trial court finds such actions
to be necessary.
Conclusion 
The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs had stand-
ing to sue Honeywell, the dump site posed an immi-
nent danger to human health and the environment,
and the excavation injunction against Honeywell was
proper.
Endnotes
1. David B. Caruso, Appeals Court Upholds Cleanup
Order on Jersey City Pollution, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
18, 2005.
2. Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Heller-Jersey City, 399 F.3d
248, 257 (3rd Cir. 2005).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2004).
4. Interfaith Cmty. Org., 399 F.3d at 263-64.
5. Id. at 259.
Photograph of tidal wetlands courtesy of NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration.
Kepo‘o v. Kane, 103 P.3d 939 (Haw. 2005).
Daniel Park, 2L, University of Hawai’i School of Law
On January 4, 2005, the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i
ruled that the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands
(DHHL) could not lease state land without first com-
pleting and accepting an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS). The court based its decision on
Chapter 343 of the Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS),
as well as the Hawai‘i Administrative Rules (HAR).
Background
In 1993, DHHL prepared a final EIS for the Kawaihae
Master Plan. The master plan, which covered approx-
imately 10,000 acres of Hawaiian home lands, desig-
nated part of the land for industrial purposes. The
EIS acknowledged a request for 30 acres of land to
construct a new power plant and required further
analysis of environmental impacts before siting the
plant. In December 1993, DHHL leased a parcel
(Lease No. 242) to Waimana Enterprises, Inc.
(Waimana) for construction and operation of a
power plant. Kawaihae Cogeneration Partners
(KCP), a partnership that included Waimana,
obtained a sublease on a portion of Lease No.
242 and prepared a  draft  Environmental
Assessment (EA) for the proposed cogeneration
power plant.  After reviewing the EA, the
Hawaiian Homes Commission (HHC) issued a
negative declaration, indicating that a separate
EIS for the proposed power plant would not be
required.
In late 1993, KCP submitted an application
for an operating permit for the power plant to
the Department of Health (DOH). The DOH issued a
draft permit for public comment and review and
approved the final permit in October 1996. James
Growney, Mauna Kea Homeowners’ Association,
Lillian K. Dela Cruz, and Josephine L. Tanimoto
(collectively “the plaintiffs”) participated in the pub-
lic comment and review of the draft operating permit.
After permit issuance, the plaintiffs subsequently
filed petitions for review of the permit with the
Environmental Appeals Board and the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
which were denied. The plaintiffs then filed suit chal-
lenging the negative declaration and the failure to
prepare a full EIS for the power plant.
The Court’s Analysis
In its opinion, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court addressed
several arguments raised by KCP, Waimana, HHC,
and DHHL (Defendants). First, KCP and Waimana
argued that Growney and Mauna Kea failed to meet
several prerequisites for seeking judicial review
under Hawai‘i’s EIS statute. The Court rejected these
arguments because the three other plaintiffs (Kepo‘o,
Dela Cruz and Tanimoto) brought judicial proceed-
ings within the thirty-day statute of limitations, and
the statute did not bar the Court from allowing other
parties to intervene at a later time. In addition, the
court held that Growney and Mauna Kea were not
required to submit comments to the draft EA in order
to intervene.
Next, the Court held that the proposed power
plant required completion of an EIS. The Court rea-
soned that the plant would result in “substantial
energy consumption,” which is a significance factor
that triggers completion of an EIS. 1 KCP and
Waimana contended that when the decision not to
require an EIS was made in 1993, the “substantial
energy consumption” factor did not exist because it
was added to the HAR in 1996. The Court, however,
determined that the power plant would trigger a sep-
arate significance factor that did exist in 1993. HRS
requires an EIS when an agency determines that the
proposed action will likely have a significant effect on
the environment. “Significant effect” is defined as the
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Photograph of Mauna Kea provided by NOAA.
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Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby, 125 S. Ct. 385
(2004).
Benjamin N. Spruill, 2L, Roger Williams School of Law
In November 2004, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that Norfolk Southern Railway Company can
limit its liability to approximately $500 per package
after a train derailment caused an estimated $1.5 mil-
lion in damage to auto machinery shipped by an
Australian manufacturer. The decision is noteworthy
as it extended federal admiralty jurisdiction inland
by holding that inland cargo carriers can limit their
financial responsibility for damage incurred during
transport pursuant to the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act (COGSA), provided that the agreement to trans-
port goods is a maritime contract and that the con-
tract evidences an intent to extend limitation of lia-
bility to the various carriers. 
Background
International maritime commerce is characterized by
shipping contracts that link ocean shipping lines
with road, rail, and air transportation. Shippers often
enter into a single contract for the transportation of
goods across sea, land, and air. Generally, a manufac-
turer faced with intermodal transport will enter into
a “through contract” with a freight forwarder. A
freight forwarder, something akin to a travel agent for
cargo, arranges for the transportation of goods by
contracting with a cargo carrier to move the goods.
The cargo carrier may then additionally contract
with a “downstream carrier” to complete a rail, road,
or air leg of the transport. Using a single through
shipping contract, a manufacturer in China can effi-
ciently arrange for the transportation of clothes from
a remote Chinese factory to a retail warehouse in
Ohio. Although the Australian manufacturer in this
case, James N. Kirby Pty. Ltd. (Kirby), entered into a
single contract to ship goods from departure to final
destination, other shipping contracts existed between
the manufacturer’s freight forwarder, cargo carriers,
and downstream carriers.
Kirby entered into a through contract with
International Cargo Control (ICC) for the trans-
portation of automobile machinery from Sydney,
Australia to Huntsville, Alabama. An ocean voyage
was arranged with a German carrier, Hamburg Sud,
to take the goods from Sydney to Savannah, Georgia.
The 336-mile inland voyage to Huntsville was to be
carried out by rail on the Norfolk Southern line. 
Contracts for the shipment of goods via ocean
transport between foreign and American ports are
classified as maritime contracts and are governed by
the COGSA, a federal uniform body of law for regu-
lating maritime contracts and settling disputes.
When cargo is damaged during transportation, the
COGSA allows a carrier to limit its liability for any
fault giving rise to the damaged goods. The default
limitation rate is $500 per package; however, parties
can negotiate a different rate. “Himalayas clauses”
extend the limitation of liability to agents or inde-
pendent contractors of the initial cargo carrier that
contracted with the freight forwarder; parties known
as downstream carriers, which can include inland
carriers such as Norfolk Southern.
As Kirby’s freight forwarder, ICC was responsi-
ble for contracting with a cargo carrier to transport
Kirby’s automobile machinery. In their contract,
Kirby and ICC agreed on the COGSA default limita-
tion of liability rate for any potential accidents aris-
ing from the ocean leg of the journey. A Himalayas
clause was incorporated into the shipping contract,
but the parties negotiated a higher limitation rate for
potential accidents arising during the inland leg of
the journey (Savannah to Huntsville).
ICC’s contract with Hamburg Sud to ship Kirby’s
equipment from Sydney to Savannah also adopted
the COGSA limitation default of $500 per package. A
Himalayas clause extended the $500 per package lim-
itation to all downstream carriers. Hamburg Sud
arranged for the downstream carrier, Norfolk
Southern, to complete the inland leg of the journey.
While the ocean leg of the journey was completed
without harm, the Norfolk Southern train derailed
en-route to Huntsville, causing an estimated $1.5
million in damage to Kirby’s equipment. 
The Lawsuit
Kirby, claiming tort and contract damages, brought
suit against Norfolk Southern in the District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia. The court found
Norfolk Southern protected by both Himalayas
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Federal Maritime Jurisdiction
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See Federal Maritime, page 8
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clauses and limited the company’s liability to $500
per package. However, on review, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the limitation of liability did not
extend to Norfolk Southern and that Kirby was not
bound by the Himalayas clauses. The court reasoned
that Norfolk Southern was not covered by Kirby’s
through contract with ICC because at the time the
agreement was entered into, Norfolk Southern had
not been contracted as the downstream carrier, and
therefore lacked the necessary relationship with the
contracting parties. Second, Kirby was not bound by
the Himalayas clause in the ICC and Hamburg Sud
shipping contract because ICC’s negotiations did not
extend to Kirby. On review, the United States
Supreme Court found that, pursuant to federal mar-
itime law, both Himalayas clauses extended limita-
tion of liability protection to Norfolk Southern.
Federal Maritime Law
Whether downstream, inland carriers are protected
by limitation of liability clauses in maritime shipping
contracts depends on the applicable law. Outcomes
can vary widely depending on whether state or feder-
al law governs the dispute. Federal maritime law
applies when there is a “maritime” contract and the
dispute is not inherently local. A maritime contract is
determined by the nature and character of the busi-
ness and whether the principle objective of the con-
tract is to further maritime commerce.1
In this case, the Court easily concluded that the
primary objectives of both Kirby’s through contract
and the ICC/Hamburg Sud shipping contract were to
accomplish transportation of goods by sea. The land
portion of the journey, although significant because it
was required to complete delivery of Kirby’s automo-
bile machinery, did not render an intercontinental
ocean voyage non-maritime. The true essence of the
shipping contracts were maritime in nature. 
As for the local nature of the dispute,  the
Supreme Court reasoned that when a state interest
overlaps a federal interest, such as preserving the
uniformity in the interpretation of maritime con-
tracts, the federal law governs. The purposes of the
COGSA, to facilitate the creation of maritime ship-
ping contracts and promote efficient maritime com-
merce, would be defeated if clauses in contracts were
interpreted differently depending upon the applica-
ble party and the leg of the journey. Specifically, if
downstream carriers cannot rely on courts to uni-
formly enforce Himalayas clauses, shipping rates
would likely increase because limitation of liability
would not be guaranteed. 
Himalayas Clauses Do Not Require Privity of
Contract
The Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s find-
ing that since Norfolk Southern did not have a rela-
tionship with a contracting party when Kirby and
ICC negotiated the through shipping contract,
Norfolk is not protected by the limitation of liability
clause extended to downstream carriers. The Court
rejected a relationship or privity requirement and
applied a traditional contract analysis, stating that
the COGSA shipping contracts must be construed by
their terms, consistent with the intent of the parties. 
The expansive terminology of the Himalayas
clause easily covered a downstream railroad carrier. A
finding of coverage, the Supreme Court held, was
consistent with the intent of Kirby and ICC;
it was clear during the formulation of the
maritime shipping contract that inland travel
was required to deliver the equipment to the
General Motors plant. 
Limited Agency Rule
ICC’s shipping contract with Kirby provided
for a higher limitation rate for inland carriers
while Hamburg Sud’s shipping contract
extended the default $500 per package limita-
tion to all downstream carriers, including
inland carriers. The Supreme Court held that
Norfolk Southern is entitled to the protection
of Hamburg Sud’s Himalayas clause, thereby
limiting liability to $500 per package. The
Court reviewed whether Kirby was subject to
Photograph of Savannah waterfront provided by NOAA; photographer Captain Albert  
E. Theberge, NOAA Corps (ret.).
ICC’s negotiated shipping contract with Hamburg
Sud. Kirby contended that ICC was not acting on
behalf of Kirby as an agent during the formulation of
the Hamburg Sud shipping contract; therefore, Kirby
cannot be bound by the lower limitation rate extend-
ed to Norfolk Southern. 
Ruling in favor of the lower limitation rate, the
Supreme Court reinforced an exception to tradition-
al agency law for freight forwarders and cargo carri-
ers.2 Although it was clear that ICC was not speaking
on behalf of Kirby during its negotiations with
Hamburg Sud, “intermediaries, entrusted with
goods are agents only in their ability to contract for
liability limitations with carriers downstream,”
thereby “ensuring the reliability of downstream con-
tracts for liability limitations.”3 Thus, a manufactur-
er may be bound by limitation rates where it had no
part in negotiating the rate. 
The Court reasoned that holding otherwise
would increase shipping rates because downstream
carriers would be forced to investigate whether
freight forwarders and cargo carriers had other con-
tractual agreements on limitation. Additionally, the
Supreme Court feared that downstream carriers
might unlawfully discriminate against freight for-
warders and cargo carriers by charging higher rates to
insure against unreliable limitation clauses.
Conclusion
Consistent with its previous decisions, the Supreme
Court held that limitation clauses can be contractual-
ly extended to downstream carriers such as Norfolk
Southern. This ruling, however, has extended the
maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts inland.
When a voyage is multi-legged, but conditioned on a
maritime shipping contract, inland carriers can enjoy
the benefits of limitation of liability pursuant to the
COGSA. Limitation of liability and federal maritime
jurisdiction could potentially extend thousands of
miles from the ocean, and may also protect rail, air,
and auto carriers, and in those hard to reach locales,
donkeys.
Endnotes
1.  Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
2.  Great Northern R. Co. v. O’Connor, 232 U.S. 508
(1914).
3.  Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby, 125 S. Ct.
385, 399 (2004).
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Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v.
U.S., 399 F.3d 1057 (2005).
In August 2003, as reported in Volume 2:3 of THE
SANDBAR, the United States District Court for the
Northern Mariana Islands ruled that the U.S. pos-
sesses superior rights to the Commonwealth’s sub-
merged lands. The Mariana Islands appealed and
the Ninth Circuit recently issued its opinion
upholding the District Court’s findings.
The Mariana Islands is a U.S. trust territory
which has retained the right of local self-govern-
ment via a Covenant Agreement approved in 1975.
The country’s relationship with the U.S. is similar
to that of Puerto Rico. Since 1978, the Mariana
Islands has been challenging U.S. assertion of sov-
ereignty over its submerged lands, going so far as to
pass domestic legislation asserting authority over a
twelve-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile Exclusive
Economic Zone. The U.S. does not recognize this
assertion of jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit found that the District Court
properly granted summary judgment to the U.S.
based on the paramountcy doctrine. Under this doc-
trine, the U.S. has “paramount rights to submerged
lands off the shores of states created from former
United States territories.” Congress can transfer
ownership to a state or territory, but it must be done
expressly. Congress transferred ownership of sub-
merged lands out to three nautical miles to the states
through the Submerged Lands Act and to Guam, the
Virgin Islands, and American Samoa through the
Territorial Submerged Lands Act. Unfortunately for
the Mariana Islands, Congress has yet to pass legis-
lation transferring ownership and the Ninth Circuit
refused to find that the Covenant Agreement, which
contains no express reservation of the Common-
wealth’s ownership, effected an implicit transfer.
The court held that the U.S. therefore has para-
mount authority over the Mariana Islands’ sub-
merged lands and any domestic legislation asserting
otherwise is preempted by federal law.
Litigation Update . . .
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Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3123 (N.D. Cal. March 1, 2005).
Danny Davis, 2L, University of Mississippi School of
Law
Okinawa dugongs, relatives of the manatee, may be
considered cultural property under the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), according to a
federal district judge for the Northern District of
California. Judge Patel, in denying a motion to dis-
miss brought by the Department of Defense (DOD),
held that the dugongs were entitled to protection
under the NHPA because the dugongs are listed as a
“natural monument” under Japan’s Law for the
Protection of Cultural Properties. 
Background
In 1995, the U.S. and Japanese governments formed
a commission for the purpose of finding ways to
reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence on
Okinawans. The commission recommended that the
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma be replaced by a
sea-based facility. In 1997, the DOD released a doc-
ument which outlined the requirements and con-
cepts of operation of the new facility, which con-
tained a recommendation that the facility be located
in Henoko Bay. Japanese government officials,
including the governor of Okinawa, accepted
Henoko Bay as the relocation site. In 2000, the
Consultative Body of Futenma Relocation was
formed. The Consultative Body, composed exclu-
sively of local and national officials from
Japan, produced the “2002 Basic Plan.”
The Basic Plan identified location, size,
construction method, and runway orienta-
tion of the 1.5 mile long sea-based facility.
Henoko Bay is rich with coral reefs and
sea grass beds that are feeding grounds for
the Okinawa dugongs. The Okinawa dugong
population has decreased to about 50.
Dugongs are currently listed as endangered
under the U.S. Endangered Species Act.
They are also listed as a protected “natural
monument” under Japan’s Law for the
Protection of Cultural Properties due to the
central role they play in the creation mythol-
ogy, folklore and rituals of traditional Okinawan
culture .  According to  a  2002 United Nations
Environmental Programme report, construction of
the sea-base facility in Henoko Bay would have seri-
ous repercussions for the dugongs because it would
destroy some of the last remaining dugong habitat
in Japan.
Conservation groups in the U.S. and Japan
joined in bringing a lawsuit against the DOD alleg-
ing that the DOD failed to comply with the require-
ments of the NHPA. The DOD filed a motion for
summary judgment for failure to state a claim and
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
National Historic Preservation Act
The purpose of the NHPA is to preserve the “histor-
ical and cultural foundations of the Nation . . . in
order to give a sense of orientation to the American
People.”1 The Act establishes a policy of the U.S.
federal government to be a leader in the “preserva-
tion of the prehistoric and historic resources of the
United States and of the international community of
nations.”2 Under the NHPA, the Secretary of the
Interior is to maintain a National Register of
Historic Places which includes districts, sites, build-
ings, structures and objects that are significant in
American history, architecture, archeology, engi-
neering, and culture. 
Section 470a-2 requires the head of a federal
agency involved in an “undertaking” outside of the
U.S. to take into account the effect on property list-
Department of Defense Must Comply
with National Historic Preservation Act
Photograph of Thailand dugong stamp.
ed on the World Heritage List or on the applicable
country’s equivalent of the National Register.
The Issues
The DOD argued that § 470a-2 of the NHPA did not
apply to their actions in Okinawa for several rea-
sons. First, it claimed the dugongs’ listing on Japan’s
Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties is not
equivalent to being listed on the National Register
because the dugong cannot constitute “property”
under the Act. Second, the DOD has not taken any
action that would be considered a federal “undertak-
ing” under the NHPA because the base relocation
was being done by the Japanese government. Third,
since the relocation project is an action taken by the
Japanese government the court lacked jurisdiction
over the matter. 
The DOD argued that “equivalent” in § 470a-2
meant equal to the U.S. National Register. According
to the DOD, Japan’s Law for the Protection of
Cultural Properties allows both inanimate and ani-
mate objects to be listed whereas the NHPA only
allows inanimate objects and does not include ani-
mals. However, the court was not convinced by this
interpretation. The court stated that if equivalent
was to be read as “equal to,” it would defy the basic
proposition that cultures vary and, furthermore, no
foreign nation’s list would meet this standard.
To determine the proper meaning of equivalent,
t h e  c o u r t  c o n s u l t e d  W e b s t e r ’ s  T h i r d  N e w
International Dictionary which defines equivalent
as “corresponding or virtually identical in effect or
function.” Using this definition, the court interpret-
ed the section to require the list be equivalent in
effect or function.3 The court concluded that Japan’s
list was equivalent with the U.S. National Register
because both lists “reflect similar motives, share
similar goals, and generally pertain to similar types
of property.”4 Also, since § 470a-2 is concerned with
property that is listed on a foreign government’s list,
it  only makes sense that “property” should be
defined according to that government’s standards
and not the U.S. domestic standard. So, if Japan
considers the dugongs cultural “property” then any
U.S. federal undertaking affecting the dugongs falls
under § 470a-2 of the Act. 
The court also rejected the DOD’s argument
that the replacement facility was not a federal
undertaking. Section 470a-2 defines an “undertak-
ing” as: “a project, activity, or program funded in
whole or in part under the direct or indirect juris-
diction of a Federal agency.”5 This includes projects
that are carried out on behalf of or for the agency,
carried out with Federal financial assistance, or
require agency approval. Since there are no cases
that interpret the meaning of “undertaking” in §
470a-2, the court looked to cases interpreting the
domestic application of the NHPA for guidance.
Courts have broadly defined “undertaking” to
include a wide range of direct or indirect federal
support, such as financing, licensing, construction,
land grants, and project supervision.6 The court con-
cluded that it would amount to a legal absurdity for
it to dismiss the case based on the replacement facil-
ity not being a federal undertaking when the facility
is being built for the U.S. military according to the
DOD’s specifications. 
Finally, the court rejected the DOD’s argument
that the court lacks jurisdiction because of the “act
of  state doctrine.” The doctrine bars judicial
review if the action being challenged involves an
official act of a foreign government within its own
territory and court action would result in the inval-
idation of that official act. The court concluded the
evidence before the court did not indicate the con-
struction of the replacement facility was truly an
official act of Japan within its own territory. Rather
it appears that it is an action intertwined with
DOD decision-making. For the doctrine to apply,
the DOD would have to show that it has untangled
itself from the project.
Conclusion
The denial of the motion to dismiss brought by the
DOD does not in itself stop the replacement facility
from being built. However, the court’s decision does
require the DOD to argue more than simply “don’t
blame us, blame the Japanese - they’re the ones
building it.”
Endnotes
1.  16 U.S.C. §470(b)(2) (2004). 
2.  Id. § 470-1(2).
3.  Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld , 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3123 at *22 (N.D. Cal. March 1, 2005).
4.  Id. at *20.
5.  16 U.S.C. §470a-2.
6.  Dugong, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123 at *43.
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Midwater Trawlers Co-operative v. Dep’t of Commerce,
393 F. 3d 994 (9th Cir. 2004).
Lance M. Young, 2L, Roger Williams School of Law
Several  f ishing industry groups,  the state  of
Washington, and the state of Oregon have been
engaged in a decades-long dispute with the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) over regulations
that accommodate the Makah Indian Tribe’s right to
harvest Pacific whiting. Upon request of the Makah
Tribe, NMFS adopted a “sliding scale method” for
determining the proper percentage of whiting to be
allocated. The sliding scale method, which takes into
account migration patterns, replaced the “biomass
method.” The change is favorable to the Indian tribe
and consequently not favorable to others that fish
Pacific whiting. Previously, the Ninth Circuit struck
down the regulation change because NMFS failed to
show that the sliding scale method was based on the
best available scientific information. On further
review, in December 2004, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the change in allocation methodology.
Treaty of Neah Bay, 1855
The Makah Indian Tribe has guaranteed fishing
rights, pursuant to the Treaty of Neah Bay, in both
marine and fresh waters of Washington. In 1855,
Makah leaders signed a peaceful agreement with
Washington Territory Governor Isaac Stevens that
relinquished most of their lands to the United States.1
Article 4 of the treaty specifically reserved the right
to hunt, fish, seal, and whale in the Tribe’s “usual and
accustomed grounds.” Usual and accustomed
grounds have been defined in specificity by modern
regulation.2 Article 4 has been the subject of national
controversy in recent years because the Tribe invoked
its reservation of whaling rights, which are contrary
to other laws and public opinion.3
The United States and seven Indian tribes initiat-
ed litigation in 1970 to clarify fishing rights provided
by the Neah Bay and other treaties. After nine years
of litigation, the United States Supreme Court held
that treaty and nontreaty fishers had equal rights to
the fishery.4 As the Court explained, catching fish was
central to social, religious, and commercial life of the
Makah and other coastal tribes who had developed
preservation techniques that enabled long distance
trade.5 The right to fish was a vital treaty term and,
according to the Court, Governor Stevens sought to
protect the fisheries from monopolization by future
settlers. The Court noted that the fishing right article
“was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant
of rights from them.”6 The Court further supported
the Washington Supreme Court’s proposition that
Indians deserve special rights based on the well-rec-
ognized principle that the United States has an oblig-
ation to protect Indian rights for the purpose of pro-
moting self-government of tribes.7 The fifty percent
apportionment of the fishery is a maximum allot-
ment. NMFS, or another applicable permitting
agency, may allot less than fifty percent, so long as the
allotment supports the tribe’s livelihood.
In 1995, the Makah Tribe invoked its fishing
rights and petitioned NMFS to allocate 25,000 met-
ric tons (one half of the harvestable surplus) of
Pacific whiting from its “usual and accustomed fish-
ing grounds.”8
Makah Fishing Rights & Allocation Methodology
NMFS regulates federal ocean waters, which extend
197 miles outward from Washington’s state jurisdic-
tional waters.9 The Magnuson-Stevens Act, which
authorizes NMFS to manage federal waters, requires
consistency between regulations and other laws
including Indian fishing rights.10 According to the
Seattle Post – Intelligencer, the Pacific whiting is the
most commercially valuable fish off the coast of
Washington and prior to 1996, the Makah Tribe was
not allocated any licenses for Pacific whiting,11 lead-
ing critics to claim that the large harvest amounts
requested by the Makah would have significant
effects on the existing whiting industry.
In 1996, NMFS established a framework for
determining the harvestable surplus of whiting that
would be allocated to the tribes in their usual and
accustomed fishing areas. Oregon, Washington, and
others filed suit to challenge this regulation in its
entirety. Meanwhile, the tribe challenged the method
used to calculate its allocation.
Initially, NMFS used “biomass methodology” for
calculating harvest allocation between treaty fishers
and non-treaty fishers. It took snapshots of geograph-
ic locations at different times to determine the total
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amount of harvestable fish at that location,
and allocated harvest amounts accordingly.
Scientific data, however, showed that the
bulk of whiting migrate through the Makah
Tribe’s fishing grounds. Biomass method-
ology does not take into account fish migra-
tion patterns, so, the Tribe argued, a sliding
scale methodology should be used instead
which takes into account migration by
varying the tribe’s allocation based on a
percentage of the “maximum sustainable
yield from the fishery.”12 An appropriation
based on optimum yield entitled the
Makah Tribe to a higher percentage of the
harvest surplus.
NMFS sought public comment on the two com-
peting methodologies and ultimately conceded to the
Makah’s proposed allocation for the 1999 season.
Oregon and Midwater Trawlers Co-operative chal-
lenged the change as a product of political compro-
mise rather than fisheries science. 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the initial regulation
but concluded that the 1999 allocation was not in
compliance with the Magnuson-Stevens Act because
NMFS did not explain the basis of its methodology
change.13 The Act requires that the allocation method-
ology be based on the best scientific information
available.14 However, relying on Supreme Court
precedent, the court confirmed that the Makah Tribe
is entitled to one half of whiting that passes through
its usual and accustomed fishing grounds.15 In subse-
quent years, NMFS has continued to support the slid-
ing scale method and it has been vigorously chal-
lenged by the fishing industry and affected states. 
Ninth Circuit Analysis
A court can reverse NMFS regulations and agency
actions only if they are found to be arbitrary, capri-
cious, or an abuse of discretion. The 1999 allocation
was not judicially reviewable because NMFS did not
explain the reason for its agency decision.16 The 2003
allocation used the same methodology, but this time
NMFS explained how the biomass methodology
failed to take into account migration of fish and pro-
vided data t h a t  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  s l i d i n g  s c a l e
methodology. Scientific data showed that whiting
migrate north through Makah fishing grounds. In
fact, the court noted “this migration pattern is signif-
icant because it means that all migrating coastal
Pacific whiting are potentially exploitable by the
Makah.”17
The court agreed with opponents that the original
adoption of this method may have been a political
compromise. Since then, however, NMFS has provid-
ed scientific data that support its conclusion that the
sliding scale method is more appropriate than the
biomass method. Because the sliding scale is based on
receiving a percentage of optimum yield of the fish-
ery and scientific data suggests that a bulk of the
Pacific fishery migrates through Makah waters,
NMFS is justified in changing its methodology. Thus,
the court deferred to the agency’s discretion. The
court also acknowledged that scientific understand-
ing of the sliding scale method is incomplete; howev-
er, a finding that scientific information is incomplete
does not exclude NMFS from concluding that the
information is the best available.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit held that sliding scale methodolo-
gy provides the best scientific information available
for allocating whiting between the Makah Tribe and
other non-treaty fishers. Since 1995, the Makah Tribe
has never requested the one half allocation of fish
that the Ninth Circuit held it is entitled to; in fact,
using a sliding scale methodology, the Tribe will be
entitled to harvest between fourteen and seventeen
percent of allotted Pacific whiting in their usual and
accustomed fishing grounds.
Endnotes
1.  Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan. 31, 1855, art.1, 12 Stat.
939. See also, Kit Oldham, Makah leaders and
Territorial Gov. Stevens sign treaty at Neah Bay
on January 31,  1855, History Link. (2005),
available at http://www.historylink.org/essays/  -
output.cfm?file_id=5364.
Drawing of Makah whale hunt provided by NOAA Historic NMFS Collection.
See Makah Tribe, page 21
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November 2001 for the wind energy plant.)
On December 4, 2001, the Corps announced it
was considering Cape Wind’s application, and invit-
ed public comments during a period ending on May
13, 2002; there were also two public hearings held
during the comment period. On August 19, 2002, the
Corps issued a § 10 permit to Cape Wind. The permit
was subject to sixteen special conditions, including:
removal of the tower within five years, posting a
$300,000 bond for emergency repairs or removal, and
a requirement that Cape Wind share its data and
allow other installations of equipment by government
agencies and research institutions. The permit
included an Environmental Assessment and Finding
of No Significant Impact, as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Cape Wind sub-
sequently constructed the data tower which is now
fully operational.
Alliance’s suit contained three arguments: first,
that the Corps lacked authority to issue a § 10 permit
for the data tower; second, that the Corps acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously by granting Cape Wind a per-
mit when Cape Wind lacked property rights on the
OCS; and finally, that the Corps failed to comply with
NEPA requirements in determining the tower’s envi-
ronmental impact. Cape Wind intervened in the case
on the side of the Corps, and both were granted sum-
mary judgment by the District Court. Alliance
appealed to the First Circuit Court.
Corps’ Authority
The Corps’ authority to grant a § 10 permit is based on
the agency’s interpretation of the OCSLA. Congress
enacted the OCSLA to establish federal authority over
the OCS and regulate the extraction of minerals from
it.2 The OCSLA extended the Corps’ § 10 authority,
“to prevent obstruction to navigation in the navigable
waters of the United States . . .  to the artificial islands,
installations, and other devices referred to in subsec-
tion (a) of this section.”3 Subsection (a) further estab-
lishes federal authority over “devices permanently or
temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be
erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, devel-
oping, or producing resources.”4 Alliance argued this
language was limited to the extraction of mineral
resources, while the Corps countered that the lan-
guage was not limiting. The District Court agreed
with the Corps’ interpretation.
The Court of Appeals found the text to be
ambiguous, and so it turned to the legislative history
to determine the Congressional intent. The Court
quoted a conference report stating: “authority of the
Corps . . . applies to  . . . fixed structures on the OCS,
whether or not they are erected for the purpose of
exploring for, developing, removing and transporting
resources therefrom.”5 The Court held that this
express legislative intent allowed the Corps to issue a
§ 10 permit to Cape Wind.
Cape Wind’s Property Interest
Alliance next argued that the Corps did not properly
evaluate Cape Wind’s lack of a property interest in
the land where it sought to build the tower before
granting the § 10 permit. The relevant regulation
states that by signing an application, the applicant is
affirming that they have, or will have, the requisite
property interest to allow for the proposed activity. 6
The Corps interprets this regulation to require only
that  it seek affirmation of property rights from an
applicant. The agency refuses to  involve itself in
property disputes. The Appeals Court held that the
Corps interpretation was entitled to deference.
Therefore, the Corps was under no obligation to con-
sider the sufficiency of Cape Wind’s property interest
when granting the permit.
In addition, Alliance argued that Cape Wind’s
affirmation of property rights was false because there
is no procedure for private entities to receive a license
to construct a tower on the federally controlled OCS.
Alliance contended that Cape Wind affirmed a prop-
erty right that they could not obtain authorization
for. However, the Appeals Court felt there was no vio-
lation of the federal government’s rights in the OCS;
the data tower in question was to be temporary and
non-exclusive. Furthermore, the tower was a single
structure which would provide valuable information
for evaluating the wind plant proposal. Since there
was no infringement on government interests, addi-
tional authorization should not be necessary.
NEPA
Lastly, Alliance alleged that more public involvement
was required in the permitting process. Alliance’s
main complaint was that the Corps did not circulate
the draft Environmental Assessment (EA) and
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for public
review. Federal regulations require an agency to
involve the public, as much as is feasible, in prepar-
ing and implementing NEPA requirements.7 The
Corps claimed it had involved the public adequately
by providing an extended comment period, holding
two public hearings, and noting and responding to
Wind Farm, from page 1
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public comments in the EA. Alliance, however,
insisted that the Corps should have circulated a draft
of the FONSI because the proposed action was with-
out precedent. Alliance claimed that Nantucket
Sound is a pristine, undeveloped area and that there
was no precedent for allowing a private research
tower on OCS lands. The Corps disagreed, drawing
the court’s attention to an existing data tower in
Martha’s Vineyard. The Appeals Court agreed that
the Corps’ determination of precedent was reason-
able because there was an established similar physi-
cal structure located nearby. Because  the environ-
mental impacts of the wind tower would be similar,
there was nothing unprecedented about the data
tower’s environmental impact. As such the Corps
had met its obligations under NEPA in preparing the
EA and FONSI.
Conclusion
The First Circuit affirmed the Army Corps of
Engineers authority to issue a permit for the con-
struction of a data tower on the Outer Continental
Shelf. It is important to note, however, that the case
did not address the actual construction of the wind
farm, which is covered by a separate permit applica-
tion filed with the Corps and currently undergoing
environmental review.
Endnotes
1. For a detailed analysis of the District Court opin-
ion, see Stephanie Showalter, Cape Wind Associates
Wins Round Two, THE SANDBAR 2:4, 1 (2004) avail-
able at http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/  -
National/SandBar%20PDF/sandbar2.4.pdf .
2. See 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1953).
3. Id. § 1333(e) (2004).
4. Id. § 1333(a)(1).
5. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1474 at 82 (1978).
6. See 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(d)(7).
7. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b).
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“sum of effects on the quality of the environment,
including actions that irrevocably commit a natural
resource . . .”2 The Court pointed out that operation
of the plant would likely cause an irrevocable com-
mitment to loss or destruction of natural resources.3
Therefore, the Court held that both the pre-1996 and
post-1996 versions of HAR’s significance criteria
required completion of an EIS.
Finally, the defendants argued that Lease No. 242
should not have been voided by the trial court.
Instead, they contended that, at most, construction of
the plant should have been enjoined until an EIS was
completed. The Court, though, held that when an
EIS is required, an agency must first accept the EIS
before the agency can approve and commence the
proposed action. It concluded that “because the lease
of state land is a use of state land even before con-
struction begins,”4 DHHL could not enter into a lease
without first completing and accepting a final EIS.
The Court noted that “the voiding of Lease No. 242
merely delays the project so that DHHL may appro-
priately consider environmental effects before ren-
dering a decision to lease.”5
Conclusion
Based on this analysis, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court
affirmed the final judgment of the trial court, but
acknowledged that a new lease could be executed
after completion and acceptance of an EIS. 
Endnotes
1.  HAW. ADMIN. R. § 11-200-12.
2.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-2.
3.  Kepo‘o v. Kane, 103 P.3d 939, 959 (Haw. 2005).
4.  Id. at 961.
5.  Id. at 962-63.
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Deaver v. The Auction Block Company , 2005 Alas.
LEXIS 20 (Alaska Feb. 25, 2005).
Stephanie Showalter
The Alaska Supreme Court recently overturned the
Superior Court and held that an online auction com-
pany which issued a fish ticket to a commercial fish-
erman was the buyer of the fish and liable for the full
price specified on the ticket.
Background
In October 1999, Dennis Deaver, an Alaskan com-
mercial fishermen, contacted The Auction Block
Company (Auction Block) to market his halibut and
sablefish catch. Auction Block conducted an online
auction and Seafood Products, a Canadian company,
placed the highest bid ($2.60 per pound). When
Deaver offloaded his catch on October 5, Auction
Block issued Deaver an Alaska Department of Fish
and Game Halibut/Sablefish Ticket (ticket) listing
Auction Block as the buyer of the fish. The price
specified on the ticket was $2.60 per pound. This
process differed slightly from a previous auction con-
ducted by Auction Block for Deaver, where Deaver
delivered the fish directly to and received the fish
ticket from the highest bidder.
Auction Block arranged for delivery of the fish to
Seafood Products. When Seafood Products inspected
the fish it received a few days later, it felt that some of
the fish were of lesser quality because of storage in
refrigerated seawater and refused to pay more than
$2.21 per pound for those fish.1 Auction Block paid
Deaver what it received from Seafood Products,
minus its commission of course. Deaver filed suit
against Auction Block to recover the difference
between the price listed on the fish ticket and that
paid by Seafood Products. Auction Block claimed
Deaver’s suit should have been directed towards
Seafood Products as Auction Block was not the actual
buyer of the fish. The Superior Court dismissed
Deaver’s claim and awarded Auction Block attorney’s
fees and costs after determining that Auction Block
was not the buyer. The Supreme Court reversed on
appeal.
Was Auction Block the “Primary Buyer”?
To provide some security to fishermen, Alaska law
requires primary fish buyers to post a bond with the
State conditioned upon a promise to pay “indepen-
dent registered commercial fishermen for the price
of the raw fishery resource purchased from them.”2 A
primary fish buyer is a person “engaging or attempt-
ing to engage in the business of originally purchas-
ing or buying any fishery resource.”3 A person who is
the first purchaser of raw fish may not operate until
it receives authorization and fish tickets from the
state, which will not be issued until the required
bond is posted.4
Auction Block argued that it was only the auc-
tioneer, not the buyer, of the fish. The Supreme Court
disagreed. Auction Block’s status as an auctioneer did
not preclude a finding that it was the primary fish
buyer for this particular transaction. The court
refused to elevate private contractual arrangements
over public policy and the legislature’s intent to pro-
tect fishermen against non-payment or underpay-
ment, stating “if the initial recipient of the fish is
deemed the primary fish buyer, its contractual role as
auctioneer cannot relieve it of its statutory duties.”5
To hold otherwise would create an exemption for auc-
tioneers the state legislature did not intend and
might result in fishermen contracting away statutori-
ly protected rights.
Although Seafood Products was also a licensed
primary fish buyer, the court found that Auction
Block was the buyer of Deaver’s fish in this situation.
Seafood Products was neither the initial recipient of
Online Fish Auctioneer Ruled 
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Anderson v. State of Minnesota, 2005 Minn. LEXIS 93
(Minn. March. 3, 2005).
Stephanie Showalter
Cases like this do not come along every day. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota recently held that a
landowner who knows honeybees are foraging on the
property must exercise reasonable care in the appli-
cation of pesticides. This case has no “salty” flavor (it
wouldn’t even qualify as brackish),
but we suspect you’ll forgive us this
minor indulgence.
Background
Jeffrey Anderson and his fellow
plaintiffs are migratory commer-
cial beekeepers with hives located
in several Minnesota counties.
The beekeepers do not own the
land upon which their hives are
located; rather they have received permis-
sion from the landowners to use their prop-
erty in exchange for money or honey. The
hives are placed near groves of poplar trees, which are
owned  or  managed  by  e i ther  the  Minneso ta
Department  of  Natural  Resources  (DNR) or
International Paper (IP) for paper production and
fuel research. 
On July 21, 1999, the DNR arranged for a con-
tractor to apply pesticides on a poplar plantation to
combat a cottonwood leaf beetle infestation. The con-
tractor used Sevin XLR Plus, a carbaryl-based pesti-
cide toxic to bees. As a result of the spraying, some of
the beekeepers’ bees died. The beekeepers sued DNR
and IP for negligently creating an unreasonable risk
of harm to the beekeeping operations, negligence per
se for violating a Minnesota pesticide statute, and cre-
ating a private nuisance.
Duty Owed to Honeybees
The court begin its analysis by stating that in
Minnesota “landowners owe a duty to use their prop-
erty so as not to injure that of others.” 1 It is not
uncommon for landowners to be held responsible for
damage caused when pesticides drift onto the proper-
ty of others. The beekeepers’ bees, however, were not
injured because pesticide drifted over the hives. The
bees were harmed while foraging in the DNR and IP
poplar groves. The two courts who had previously
addressed this issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
and the California Court of Appeals, refused to assign
liability when bees, foraging on the land of another,
came into contact with a pesticide because the bees
were considered trespassers.2
The Minnesota Supreme Court reached a differ-
ent conclusion. The court found
t h a t  w h i l e  l a n d o w n e r s  i n
Minnesota owe only a limited
duty  to  t respass ing  l ives tock
(refraining from willful or wanton
negligence), “once the landowner dis-
covers the trespassing animals’
presence, the landowner is
‘bound to use reasonable
c a r e  t o  a v o i d  i n j u r i n g
them.’”3 The beekeepers
allege that DNR and IP inten-
tionally sprayed pesticide in a
plantation where they knew bees
were foraging. The court deter-
mined that the beekeepers provided
enough evidence of actual knowledge to
survive summary judgment and proceed to trial.
Specifically, the court stated “if, as the beekeepers
allege, the DNR and IP had actual knowledge or were
on notice of foraging honey bees, they may have come
under a duty of reasonable care.”4
As for the beekeepers’ remaining claims, the
court held that the beekeepers may have a valid negli-
gence per se claim if the pesticide application was not
consistent with the label directions (a violation of the
Minnesota Pesticide Control Act). The court, howev-
er, dismissed the private nuisance claim because the
beekeepers did not own the land upon which the
hives were located and therefore lacked the required
property interest. 
Endnotes
1.  Anderson v. State of Minnesota, 2005 Minn. LEXIS
93 at *5 (Minn. March. 3, 2005).
2.  Id. at *7.
3.  Id. at *8.
4.  Id. at *8-9.
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scow causing it to crash into the Super Scoop. The col-
lision sent Stewart careening head-first through the
hatch and onto the lower deck.
Stewart sued Dutra for compensation under the
Jones Act, claiming that he was a seaman, and that
his injuries were a result of Dutra’s negligence.
Stewart  f i led an al ternative  c laim under  the
Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act
(LHWCA), claiming he was a covered employee who
could sue the owner of the vessel for negligence. Prior
to the Jones Act, seamen were barred from negligence
claims against shipowners because such injuries were
viewed as an assumed risk of employment. In 1920,
Congress enacted the Jones Act to provide sea-based
maritime workers a remedy for tortious injuries. In
1927, Congress extended these worker’s compensa-
tion benefits to land-based maritime employees
through the LHWCA. It is important to note that a
worker cannot fall under both statutes. The LHWCA
specifically exempts from coverage “a master or
member of a crew of any vessel.”1
At trial, Dutra conceded that Stewart was a mem-
ber of the Super Scoop’s crew, but argued that the
Super Scoop was not a vessel for purposes of the Jones
Act. The district court ruled that the dredge did not
fall within the meaning of a “vessel” under the Jones
Act because its primary purpose was dredging, not
transportation. On interlocutory appeal, the First
Circuit affirmed this finding and also concluded that
Stewart’s seaman status “depended on the movement
of the Super Scoop (which was stationary) rather than
the scow.”2 The First Circuit remanded the case to the
district court to decide Stewart’s alternate LHWCA
claim. 
As if things were not already confusing enough,
on remand Dutra stipulated that the Super Scoop was
a vessel under the LHWCA. Despite its stipulation,
the district court granted Dutra summary judgment
because “Dutra’s alleged negligence was committed
in its capacity as an employer rather than as owner of
the vessel” as required by the LHWCA.3 The First
Circuit agreed with the district court, but noted that
the LHWCA’s definition of vessel is more inclusive
than the Jones Act’s definition. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to clarify the standard for deter-
mining when a watercraft is a “vessel” under the
LHWCA.
What is a “Vessel”?
The LHWCA does not define “vessel.” Congress,
however, provides a default definition for statutes
passed after February 25, 1871, in 1 U.S.C. § 3, which
states “the word ‘vessel’ includes every description of
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or
capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
water.” The question for the court, therefore, was
whether the Super Scoop was a vessel under § 3. If a
watercraft is a vessel under § 3, it is a vessel under the
LHWCA.
A dredge is very different from traditional seago-
ing vessels. Dredges do not have their own means of
propulsion and are not designed to carry passengers
or cargo. These differences, however, do not prevent
dredges from qualifying as vessels under U.S. law.
Courts have a long history, even prior to passage of
the Jones Act and the LHWCA, of classifying dredges,
barges, and floating platforms as vessels because they
are capable of maritime transportation. The Supreme
Court “has often said that dredges and comparable
watercraft qualify as vessels under the Jones Act and
the LHWCA.”4
Dutra argued, however, that the Supreme Court
has implicitly limited the § 3 definition through sev-
eral rulings that denied vessel status when the water-
craft was “not practically capable of being
used to transport people, freight, or cargo
from place to place.”5 The Court stated that
Dutra was misinterpreting this line of
cases and clarified that there is a distinc-
tion between watercraft that are perma-
nently attached to the shore or on the
ocean floor for extended periods of time
and those that are temporarily immobile.
The Court stated that the former are not
‘capable of being used’ for maritime trans-
port, but the latter are. If the watercraft is
not capable of being meaningfully used for
maritime transport, then it cannot be con-
sidered a vessel under § 3. 
Super Scoop, from page 1
Photograph of Super Scoop provided by Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.
The Court drew the parties’ attention to several
instances where it denied vessel status for this very
reason. These included a wharfboat attached to the
mainland; a drydock which was moored and consid-
ered a fixed structure because it had not been moved
for twenty years; a floating casino which was moored
to the shore in a permanent fashion; and a floating
processing plant with a large hole in her hull. The
Supreme Court did not consider these watercraft ves-
sels under § 3 because “[s]imply put, a watercraft is
not ‘capable of being used’ for maritime transport in
any meaningful sense if it has been permanently
moored or otherwise rendered practically incapable
of transportation or movement.”6
The Super Scoop was obviously capable of mar-
itime transport. “Indeed, it could not have dug the
Ted Williams Tunnel had it been unable to traverse
the Boston Harbor, carrying workers like Stewart.”7 It
is therefore a vessel for purposes of §3, the Jones Act,
and the LHWCA. 
The Supreme Court went on to clarify that a
watercraft need not be used primarily for transporta-
tion to qualify as a vessel. The ability to be used for
transportation is sufficient. The Court also stated
that a watercraft does not need to be in motion to
qualify. The fact that the Super Scoop was idle when
Stewart’s accident occurred did not destroy its status
as a vessel.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that “[u]nder § 3, a ‘vessel’
is any watercraft practically capable of maritime
transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or
state of transit at a particular moment.”8 The Super
Scoop, therefore, is a vessel and its workers are eligi-
ble for seaman status under the Jones Act if they are
masters or members of its crew. If they do not qualify
as seamen, they may be entitled to compensation as
land-based workers under the LHWCA. The Court
remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings.
Endnotes
1. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G).
2. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 125 S. Ct. 1118, 1122
(2005).
3. Id. at 1122-23.
4. Id. at 1123.
5. Id. at 1126.
6. Id. at 1127.
7. Id. at 1128.
8. Id. at 1129.
Deaver’s fish nor the issuer of Deaver’s fish ticket.
“Because Auction Block issued its own fish ticket to
Deaver when Deaver delivered his fish to Auction
Block, . . . Auction Block was the buyer of the fish.”6
Was Auction Block a Buyer Under the UCC?
Deaver also argued that Auction Block was a buyer
under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and
subject to its rules regarding acceptance of non-con-
forming goods. The Supreme Court found that fish
are goods as defined by the UCC and Auction Block
qualified as a “buyer” as one “who buys or contracts
to buy goods.”7 In Alaska, acceptance of goods occurs
when the buyer “after a reasonable opportunity to
inspect the goods, signifies to the seller that the goods
are conforming or that the buyer will take or retain
them in spite of their nonconformity.” 8 Because
Auction Block had the opportunity to inspect
Deaver’s fish and did not indicate than any defects
were present, the court found it had accepted Deaver’s
fish. Auction Block must pay the contract price for
any goods accepted, unless it can establish a breach
with respect to the goods accepted.9
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that an online fish auction
company can be the primary fish buyer. The case was
remanded to the Superior Court for further consider-
ation of Deaver’s claims against Auction Block.
Endnotes
1.  Seafood Products downgraded 19,000 pounds of
fish. This price reduction was consistent with
Seafood Products bid, which “specified that
Seafood Products would inspect the halibut at its
plant and that it would pay fifteen percent less for
‘number two’ quality halibut.” Deaver v. The
Auction Block Company, 2005 Alaska LEXIS 20 at
*6 (Alas. Feb. 25, 2005). 
2.  ALASKA STAT. § 44.25.040 (2004).
3.  Id. §16.10.296.
4.  5 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE § 39.130(a)(1).
5.  Deaver, 2005 Alas. LEXIS at * 21.
6.  Id. at *28.
7.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.103(a)(1).
8.  Id. § 45.02.606(a)(1).
9.  Id. § 45.02.607.
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Reyes v. U.S., 349 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. P.R. 2004).
Jason E. Brown, 3L, University of Mississippi School of
Law
A Puerto Rico district court recently held that the
decision of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to
place dredge material on a beach was discretionary
and not subject to litigation under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. 
Background 
On January 20, 1999 the Corps announced its inten-
tion to conduct emergency dredging of the naviga-
tion channel in Arecibo Harbor, Puerto Rico. The
project involved dredging and removing an estimat-
ed 60,000 to 80,000 cubic yards of material from the
harbor. The notice stated that the material would be
temporarily stockpiled on the beach until the Port
Authority could remove it to an upland disposal
site. An Environmental Assessment was prepared
by the local and federal agencies, but the Port
Authority subsequently decided it did not want the
dredged material. The Corps’ proposed alternative
to upland deposit was placement in near-shore cir-
culation to address erosion problems along the
Arecibo coast. 
The work commenced on June 9, 2000, but was
soon halted by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
when it found out the Corps was depositing the
dredge material on top of a coral community. The
Corps then sought and received an exception to a
water quality certificate from the Puerto Rico
Environmental Quality Board (EQB) to deposit the
dredge material on the actual beach. Dredging
resumed and the remaining material was placed on
the beach, raising the beach’s elevation fifteen feet.
Despite the raise in elevation, the top of the
sand remained below street level. A stone concrete
wall was already in place, but an additional silt
fence was constructed to minimize the blowing
sand. Local surfers, however, protested the erection
of the silt fence (it must have blocked access) and
repeatedly tore it down. The fence was replaced sev-
eral times.
Discretionary Power
The Reyes sought compensation from the Corps for
damages they claim resulted from sand and dust blow-
ing onto their property from the disposal site. The
United States is immune from law suits except to the
extent it has consented. Through the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), the United States has consented to
suits for damages caused by negligent acts or omissions
of federal employees.1 The FTCA has some exceptions,
however; the most notable prohibits suits based on a
federal agency’s performance of or failure to perform a
discretionary function. A court looks at two factors to
determine whether an act falls within the discretionary
function exception: first, the existence of discretion,
and second, whether or not the type of discretion
allowed warrants public policy scrutiny.2
The Reyes argued that the Corps had no discre-
tion in choosing where to place the dredged material
because it had to obtain a water quality certificate or
waiver from the EQB. The court stated that a permit
requirement does not destroy the discretionary nature
of the act itself. “Submitting a request for a permit or
waiver to the local government pursuant to law does
not automatically eradicate the discretion exercised
by the federal agency.”3 The Corps had to make a
number of decisions about where to place the dredge
materials and take into account several environmental
and public policy concerns. The Corps weighed many
alternatives and coordinated with both federal and
local agencies. Ultimately, the decision where to place
the material is the Corps’ to make. 
Conclusion
The court dismissed the Reyes’ tort claim under the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The
court also found that the Reyes failed to show a
causal  connection between the deposit ion of
dredged material on the beach and the damage to
their house.
Endnotes
1. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b).
2. Reyes v. U.S., 349 F. Supp. 2d 234, 238 (D. P.R.
2004).
3. Id. at 240.
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2. 50 C.F.R. § 660.324(c)(1). “Makah — That portion
of the FMA north of 48 [degrees] 02’15” N. lat.
(Norwegian Memorial) and east of 125 [degrees]
44’00” W. long.”
3.  See Anderson v. Evans, 371 F.3d 475 (9th Cir. 2004);
Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2000). 
4.  Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 689 (1979).
5.  Id. at 666.
6.  Id. at 681.
7. Id. at 673. See also, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
555 (1974).
8.  See Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th
Cir. 1999).
9.  States have ownership of navigable waters that
extend  three  mi les  f rom the i r  coas t l ines .
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1301.
10. Wash. State Charterboat Ass’n v. Baldridge, 702 F.2d
820, 823 (9th Cir. 1983).
11. AP, 15,000 Tons of Whiting for Makah Tribe Entitled
to Harvest Groundfish, Agency Says, SEATTLE POST –
INTELLIGENCER, June 6, 1996, at B5.
12. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(28)(B).
13. Midwater  Trawlers  Co-operat ive  v .  Dep’ t  o f
Commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 719 (9th Cir. 2002).
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2).
15. Midwater Trawlers ,  282 F.3d at 719; see also,
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 687 (1979).
16. Midwater  Trawlers  Co-operat ive  v .  Dep’ t  o f
Commerce, 393 F.3d 994, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004).
17. Id.
We’ve all had this experience. You sit down to read a
case involving fisheries, ports, coastal management,
or any other marine policy issue and within the first
few paragraphs the legal analysis is obscured by jar-
gon, scientific terminology, and an alarming number
of acronyms. Brownfields, maximum sustainable
yield, indicator species, upwelling, UNCLOS, IMO,
LMEs, LIDAR, etc., etc. It’s impossible for anyone to
keep up.
Well, our lives have just gotten a little easier with
the publication of Niels West’s new Marine Affairs
Dictionary. Inspired by a student’s complaint “that
there were too many terms and concepts within the
broad rubric of marine affairs that were difficult to
search out and identify,” West set out to compile
descriptions of key marine affairs concepts and terms
- a task that would take him seven years to complete.
It was worth the wait.
Attorneys, economists, resources managers,
and coastal planners now have a source to turn to
when they need something explained, be it a scien-
tific term, legal concept, case, or international con-
vention. Don’t know what a hammock or a dugong
is? Look it up. Forgot the holding in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council or National Audubon Society
v. Superior Court of Alpine County? It’s in there. Need
the definition of maelstrom? You guessed it, it’s in
there. (FYI - “an area of disturbed water about 7 km
(4.3 mi) long created by the opposing forces of winds
and tides which results in a circular motion of the
water.”) The Marine Affairs Dictionary even has an
entry for Zulu time, allowing me to keep track of the
events in JAG for the very first time.
With hundreds of entries on maritime terminolo-
gy, U.S. statutes, international bodies, and non-govern-
mental organizations such as the Mangrove Action
Project and the National Maritime Council, the Marine
Affairs Dictionary is destined to become an invaluable
reference guide for marine affairs professionals and
students. It should never, however, be far out of the
reach of anyone working on marine issues.
Book Review . . .
Stephanie Showalter
Marine Affairs Dictionary: Terms, Concepts,
Laws, Court Cases, and International
Conventions and Agreements
Niels West (Praeger, 2004)
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Approximately 300 right whales remain in the North
Atlantic. The whales’ future looks rather bleak.
Decimated by years of whaling, right whales need
time to recover and reproduce. While it may sound
like hyperbole, the loss of one female could send the
species the way of the dodo, the passenger pigeon,
and the Steller’s sea cow. Although right whales are
no longer hunted and are protected by endangered
species laws in both the United States and Canada,
human activities continue to pose a significant threat
to the survival of these creatures. Because right
whales spend a large portion of their lives feeding at
the surface, they are particularly prone to ship strikes
and entanglement in fishing gear.
To reduce the ship strike threat, the U.S. and
Canada issue warnings to mariners and alter ship-
ping lanes. While these measures are not as simple as
they sound, the ship strike issue seems to engender
less conflict than entanglement. The politics of U.S.
fisheries management have always been heated and
the right whale issue is a classic battle pitting fisher-
men, environmentalists, and government regulators
against each other. Tora Johnson, despite taking on
the daunting task of “mapping the political mine-
fields of fisheries management and whale protec-
tion,” has written an extremely readable history of
whale entanglements in the North Atlantic. In
Entanglements: The Intertwined Fates of Whales and
Fishermen, Johnson allows the reader to tag along on
her journey to discover why, despite the efforts of
hundreds of scientists, fishermen, and ordinary citi-
zens on both sides of the border, whale entanglement
remains such a serious problem.
Anyone involved in fisheries management should
read Entanglements. Johnson’s accounts of annual
meetings  of  the  North Atlantic  Right  Whale
Consort ium,  the  At lant ic  Large  Whale  Take
Reduction Team (TRT), and the Maine Fishermen’s
Forum are an invaluable case study of how long-sim-
mering tensions, mistrust, and the federal bureau-
cracy can smother great ideas and frustrate partici-
pants to the point they walk away from the table. It is
apparent that everyone involved in New England
fisheries management agrees that something must be
done to reduce whale mortality due to fishing gear.
Getting individual members of such disparate inter-
est groups as disentanglement specialists, commer-
cial fishermen, environmental activists, National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) employees, and
the members of the TRT to agree on what should
actually be done, however, is a Sisyphean task.
Johnson’s frustration with the process and lack of
progress is palatable.
Entanglements is not all doom and gloom. There
are glimmers of hope - the fisherman who received
money from the International Fund for Animal
Welfare to remove abandoned gear; the state manag-
er who is respected and trusted by fishermen. These
glimmers, unfortunately, might be too little, too late.
Humans have caused this problem. “As the past dis-
solves before our eyes, some people mourn the tragic
loss, beg for vestiges to be preserved, yearn for the
old days. But when we are alone at night staring at
the ceiling, we can’t escape the fact that the ways of
the past have lead us here.” Let’s hope for the sake
of the whales and the fishermen, we are able for once
to accept responsibility, put our differences aside,
and solve it.
Book Review . . . 
Stephanie Showalter
Entanglements: The Intertwined
Fates of Whales and Fishermen
Tora Johnson (University Press of Florida, 2005)
The Monterey Bay Aquarium reluctantly released its juvenile great white shark back to the wild after it began
hunting its tankmates. The aquarium acquired the baby shark after its capture by a halibut fisherman in
August 2004. You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to anticipate that it might be difficult to keep a great white
shark in captivity. Until recently, the longest a great white had survived in captivity was 16 days. Monterey’s
shark made it 168 days, but the Aquarium staff decided it would be best to cut the 162-pound shark loose after
it killed two soupfin sharks in February and exhibited classic hunting behavior. Incredibly, the Aquarium
claims it will try to find another juvenile shark to place in the exhibit. There goes the neighborhood.
As directed by a Congressional rider, on March 15, 2005
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) published a
Final List of Bird Species to Which the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act Does Not Apply (70 Fed. Reg. 12,710). On
December 8, 2004, Congress amended the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) to exclude non-native, human-
introduced birds from its protections and required the
FWS to identify excluded species. The MBTA was
amended in response to the court-ordered injunction of
the Chesapeake mute swan cull. The mute swan is, of
course, a listed species as well as numerous other migra-
tory birds such as the black swan, blue tit, orange-breast-
ed bunting, Eurasian spoonbill, and silver gull. The
development of the list was vigorously opposed by the
Humane Society and several other animal-rights groups.
The National Ocean Service (NOS) has issued Final Criteria and Data Fields for an Inventory of Existing
Marine Managed Areas (70 Fed. Reg. 3,512). Executive Order 13158, signed by President Clinton in May
2000, directs the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the Department of Interior (DOI) to develop a
national system of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). The criteria and data fields will be used by NOS to devel-
op the Marine Managed Areas (MMA) inventory, which may be used in the future to determine which
marine sites should be placed on the national MPA list and included in the network. NOS uses six criteria -
area, marine, reserved, lasting, protection, and cultural - to select sites for inclusion in the inventory. For
more information, please visit the National MPA Center’s website at http://www.mpa.gov/ .
Around the Globe
On March 23, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Committee of Fisheries adopted volun-
tary guidelines for the ecolabelling of fish products. Ecolabels indicate that a product has been produced
in a sustainable, environmentally-friendly manner and enable consumers to make informed choices about
the products they buy. Ecolabelling schemes are growing in popularity and the Marine Stewardship
Council is leading the charge with respect to wild fisheries. The new guidelines are directed at govern-
ments and organizations with or considering ecolabelling programs for marine capture fisheries and out-
line general principles, including the need for independent auditing and transparency, and minimum
requirements and criteria for assessing fisheries. The guidelines are available on the FAO’s website at
http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2005/100302/index.html .
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Photograph of mute swans provided by NOAA, Photographer Mary 
Hollinger, NESDIS/NODC biologist.
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